Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2002

The State of Utah v. Steve Gomez and Jacqueline
Gomez : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Khris Harrold; Nancy Bergeson; Legal Defenders Association; Attorneys for Respondents.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; J. Stephen Mikita; Assistant Attorney General; T.L. Ted
Cannon; Salt Lake County Attorney; Gregory L. Brown; Deputy County Attorney; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, The State of Utah v. Steve Gomez and Jacqueline Gomez, No. 20520.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2009

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant
vs .
STEVE GOMEZ and
JACQUELINE GOMEZ

Case No. 20520

Defendants/Respondents:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF TWO COUNTS
OF FALSELY MAKING, CODING OR SIGNING
EVIDENCE OF A FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD
TRANSACTION, BOTH SECOND DEGREE FELONIES
IN VIOLATION OF §76-6-506.1 (SUP?. 1983),
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, JUDGE,

UTAH S U P R E P R E S I D I N G •

20$>2D
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
J. STEPHEN MIKITA
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 34114
T.L. "TED" CANNON
Salt Lake County Attornev
GREGORY L. BOWll'
Deputy Countv Attornev
231 East 40n" South, Suite 300
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111
Attornevs for Appellant

NANCY BERGESON & KHRIS HAR.ROLD
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assn
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attornevs for Respondents

FILED
JAN 61986

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

Statement of Facts

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

2

ARGUMENTS

2

POINTS I:

POINT II:

SINCE THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS OFFERED
BY THE STATE, IT SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY
BE ALLOWED TO APPEAL THE GRANTING OF THAT
MOTION

2

EVEN IF THIS APPEAL WAS PROPERLY TAKEN,
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING
THAT THE LESSER PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. §76T
6-506.2 WERE THE CHARGEABLE "OFFENSES . . . . 5

CONCLUSION

12

ADDENDUMS. . .

14-18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) . . . .

11

People v. Burns, 593 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1979) . . . . .

7,11

People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1985) . . .

7

People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233 (Colo. 1983). . . . .

8

State v. Bryan, 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 17(November 2 7, 1985)7
State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1932)

7

State v. Hobson, 671 P.2d 1365 (Kansas 1983) . . . .

7

State v. Kelbach, 569 P. 2d 1100 (Utah 1969)

3,5

State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) . . . . .

8,9,11

State v. Waddoups, 24 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (December 12,
1985)
"

3,4

STATUTES CITED
§76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983), Utah Code Ann
§76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983), Utah Code Ann

iii,1,5 ,6 ,7 ,9 J
11
iii,5,6,7,9,10

§76-6-506.1 (Repealed 1983)

9

§77-17-1, Utah Code Ann

12

§77-35-26 (1953 as amended), Utah Code Ann

3,4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•i i

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Should the State be allowed to appeal its own motion

of dismissal?
2.

Did the trial court have sufficient reasoning to

justify its ruling that Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983)
and §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983) proscribe identical conduct so
that prosecution cannot be made under the higher penalty
offense?

iii
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellant

:

vs.

:

STEVE GOMEZ and
JACQUELINE GOMEZ

:

Case No. 20520

Defendants/Respondents:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Steve and Jacqueline r-omez, were charged by
information with two counts of wrongful use of a financial
transaction card, a felony of the second degree under Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1933).

On January 31, 19S5, a hearing

was conducted before the Honorable Judith Billings, Jud^e, in
the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to consider the defendant's
motion to reduce the offenses charged.

At the conclusion of

the hearing all charges against each defendant were dismissed.
Statement of Facts
The information filed against the defendants charged them
with wrongful use of an American Express credit card on November
27, 1984 (R.18-19). Counsel for the defendants made a motion to
reduce the charges from second degree felonies under Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) to either third degree felonies
or class A misdemeanors under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501.2 (See
Addendum A) (R.27,23,31-34).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On January 31, 1985 a hearing was conducted by Judith
Billings, Judge for the Third Judicial District Court (T.l).
The defendants! counsel presented arguments supporting the
motion to reduce the charges (T.l-23).

Witnesses were also

present and ready to testify as to the value of the goods
alleged to have been fraudulently obtained (T.14), necessary
for the reduced charge.

i
Upon the ruling of the trial court that the motion to reduce
the charges was proper, the State moved to dismiss the case rather
than simply amend the information (T.14-16).

After hearing

argument the motion was granted and all charges were dismissed
(T.26-28).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
i
Since the State's attorney moved to dismiss the charges
rather than amend the information, the State should not now be
permitted to appeal the ruling.

The instances in which the

State may appeal is restricted by statute and such an appeal
should not be allowed from the State's own motion of dismissal.
Even if this appeal is allowed by statute, the trial court
was correct in its conclusion that charges should have been
reduced.

The statutory provisions clearly overlap and the

defendants were thus entitled to the benefit of the lesser
charge.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
SINCE THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS OFFERED BY
THE STATE, IT SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE
ALLOWED TO APPEAL THE GRANTING OF THAT
MOTION.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

The circumstances under which the State may anneal adverse
rulings of the trial court in criminal cases have traditionally
been limited by constitutional and statutory provisions. State
v. Waddoups, 24 Utah Adv. Ren. 3 (Dec. 12, 1935).

In State v.

Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1969) this Court held the State has
no right to appeal except as expressly provided by statute.
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure have codified the
restrictions on State-initiated appeals in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26
(1953 as amended), which delineates a narrow category of cases
in which the prosecution may take an appeal. (See Addendum B).
The State in this case has attempted to circumvent the
statutory restrictions on what it may appeal by requesting a
dismissal at the hearing in the trial court and then relying
on Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (c) (1) (1953 as amended), which
permits an appeal of right by the State "from a final judgment
of dismissal." To allow the State an appeal of right in such
a circumstance would give the State an appeal of right from
virtually every adverse pretrial order.
The record in the instant case clearly revedls -".that the
defendants submitted a "Motion to Reduce Offenses Charged From
Second Degree Felonies to Third Degree Felonies." (T.3-4). The
motion to dismiss the charges was proffered by the State, which
did not wish to amend the information to charge the lesser
offenses (T. 14-16).

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4

In State v. Waddoups, supra, this Court considered

g

a situation the same as the present case. Waddoups involved
a criminal case which was dismissed upon a motion by the State.
The motion to dismiss was proffered by the State only after it
lost a pretrial ruling declaring a witness incompetent to
testify and suppressing the witness's out-of-court statements.
Id. at 3.

—

4

The Court concluded in Waddoups that allowing the State to
move to dismiss after losing pretrial rulings "would be
inconsistent with our law and would be a distortion of the

I
language and intent of the statute." Id., at 3.

To allow otherwise,

the State with all its resources and power would be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged

I
offense, thereby subjecting him to undue harassment. .
In the present case, when the trial court ruled to reduce
the offenses charged, the State should have either amended the
i
information and proceeded on the reduced charges or moved to
have the case dismissed without instigating this appeal. The
State has taken this appeal only in attempt to circumvent the
4
intent of §77-35-26 (c).

Indeed, here as in Waddoups, the State

is seeking to have this Court review not the order of dismissal
but the underlying order which in this case would not be
otherwise reviewable.

The Court must not allow such a subterfuge

and must dismiss this appeal as it did in Waddoups, supra.
Any claim by the State that such a result is unfair or
improper should be addressed by the state legislature and not
-4-
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i

this forum.

This Court stated the position perfectly in State

v. Kelbach,, 569 P. 2d at 1102, where it noted, "as a general
proposition the law as established should remain so until
changed by the legislature, whose perogative it is to make and
change the law."
POINT II
EVEN IF THIS APPEAL WAS PROPERLY TAKEN,
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING""
THAT THE LESSER PROVISIONS OF U;C.A: §76-6
506.2 WERE THE CHARGEABLE OFFENSES. ' "
The defendants were each charged with two counts of Wrongful
use of a Financial Transaction Card, both second degree felonies
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) (R. 18-19).
The illegal conduct prohibited by this section is :
Any person who, with intent to defraud,
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses,
or encodes magnetically or electronically
any financial transaction card, or who with
intent to defraud, signs the name of another
or a fictitious name to a financial transaction
card, sales slip, sales draft, or any instrument
for the payment of money which evidences a
financial transaction card transaction, is guilty
of a felony of the second degree.
While conduct under the above section is a second degree
felony, the same acts of the defendants could have been charged
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983), which is classified
as either a misdemeanor or a felony of the third degree. §76-6506.2 states that:
It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud,
obtain or attempt to obtain credit or
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purchase or attempt to purchase goods,
property, or services, by the use of a
false, fictitious, altered, counterfeit,
revoked expired stolen, or fraudulently
obtained financial transaction card, by any
financial transaction card credit number,
personal identification code, or by the use
of a financial transaction card not authorized
by the issuer or the card holder;

I

*

Before trial on the merits the defendants submitted a
motion and supporting memoranda to reduce the charges filed

.

from a second degree felony to a third degree felony or a class
A misdemeanor.(R.27,28,31-34)

The basis of the motion was that

since §76-6-506.1 and §76-6-506.2 prohibit the same conduct that of fraudulently obtaining goods by use of a financial
transaction card - the latter provision should apply since it
carries the lower penalty. (See Addendum A ) .
The trial court granted the defendant's motion (T. 28), but
dismissed all charges. While the State obiected to the defendants1
claim that §76-6-506.2 was the correct charge, it moved the court
to dismiss the charges rather than reduce them. (T.15-16) (See
Addendum C).
The state now appeals, arguing that the defendants were
<

properly charged.

First, the State argues that the elements

of the provisions are different so that §76-6-506.1 is the correct
charge.

In the alternative, if the Court finds each section
i

to contain the same elements, the State argues §76-6-506.1 still
applies as being more specific.

The State's contentions are

wrong for a number of reasons.
<
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It is well founded under either the federal or state
judicial systems that an accused person is assured of the
rational and evenhanded application of criminal law. Equal
protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all who
are similarly situated.

State v. Bryan, 23 Utah Adv. Rep.

17, (November 27, 1985) .
Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written so that there
are significant differences between offenses. Unless statutory
classificiations of crimes are based on differences which are
real in fact, certain unlawful conduct might be subject to
different penalties, depending on which statutory sanctions a
prosecutor chooses to charge.
1237 (Colo. 1983).

People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233,

Such laws allow a form of arbitrariness

which is foreign to our system of equal protection.

State v.

Bryan, supra.
Thus, in situations where two statutes proscribe the same
conduct, courts allow whichever sanction carries the lesser
penalty.

State v. Bryan, supra; People v. Owens, supra; People

v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1985); State v. Hales, 652
P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982).
does

In the trial of a criminal case, duplicity

not depend upon whether facts proved at trial are actually

used to support conviction of both offenses charged, but
rather turns upon whether necessary elements of proof of one
crime are included in the other.

State v. Hobson, 6 71 P.2d 1365,

1372 (Kansas 1983) .

-7-
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In its brief, the State incorrectly concludes that the
statutes do not contain the same elements.

(See Appellant's

brief at 14-15).
A clear reading of §76-6-506.1 and §76-6-506.2 reveals
4
that each contains the same elements. Under either provision
a person must (1) have an intent to defraud another, by (2)
the use of a stolen or altered financial transaction card, which
I
(3) evidences a sale, a rendering of services or other similar
transaction.

The claim by the State that §76-6-506.1 is

distinguishable because it requires a "signing" while §76-6-506.

i
2 involves telephone-type sales where no "signing" takes place
is clearly erroneous.
Legislative enactments must be given effect according to their
plain and obvious meaning.

Statutory classifications of crimes

must be based on differences which are real in fact and reasonably
related to purposes of legislation.

People v. Owens, suora.

In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), this Court noted:
The well-established rule is that a statute
creating a crime should be sufficiently
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence
who desire to obey the law may know how to
conduct themselves in conformity with it.
A fair and logical concomitant of that rule
is that such a penal statute should be
similarly clear, specific and understandable
as to the penalty imposed for its violation.
(citations omitted) Id. at 148.
Shondel saw this Court reconcile a criminal statute making
possession of LSD a misdemeanor with an overlapping statute
which made the offense a felony.

In searching for the applicable

sanction the Court noted a provision in the act with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

harshest penalty which stated that any conflicting legislation
was to govern, regardless of which penalty was harshest. This
meant that only the provisions of the more lenient law applied.
No such situation exists in the present case.
Prior to the enactment of the present sections in dispute,
the signing of a fraudulent or ficticious name in using a
financial transaction card was clearly covered under older
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506 (repealed 1983).

(See

Addendum D). Indeed, the repealed section closely parallels
the present provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983).
The only changes in the provision reflect the classfication of
the crime according to the material value of goods involved.
Thus, the provisions of each section of the statute require
the same conduct, entitling the defendants to be charged under the
provision with the lesser penalties.

State v. Shondel, supra.

At no point does the State's brief examine how the elements of
the two sections differ or even how the defendants1 conduct
could not have been charged under §76-6-506.2.
The State position that §76-6-506.1 governs because it
requires an actual "signing11 defies logic. The vast majority
of credit sales involve a "signing" by the card user. To limit
§76-6-506.2 to those instances where a card user orders goods
over the phone will deny enforcement of that provision in the
vast majority of fraudulent transaction card purchases. Such
is not the "plain and obvious" meaning of §76-6-506.2.

-9-
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I

In the alternative, the state argues that even if the

j

elements of the sections are the same, the defendants should
be charged under §76-6-506.1 since that provision is more
specific.

*

Such a position is also not supportable.

A view of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) reveals
that the focus of its provisions are toward the manufacture
of false financial cards leaving use of an unlawfully obtained
card to §76-6-506.2. Such an interpretatation is logical when
viewing the penalties of each provision. Under §76-6-506.1 the
manufacturer of potentially hundreds of stolen or altered cards
would commit a second degree felony while under §76-6-506.2
the user is guilty of a third degree felony or misdemeanor
depending upon the value of the goods or services obtained.
The Statefs view distinguishing the two sections makes
its position untenable. Why punish a person who obtains
goods by "signing" a receipt more severely than another person
i
1

who obtains the same goods by "using' a fraudulent card over
the phone?

No policy reasons can be given.

Is there a greater

danger to society when a defendant "signs" his name' while
i

"using" the fraudulent card instead of "using" the same card
without ever physically signing the sales slip?

For examnle,

would a defendant who purchases an airline ticket by phone,
giving only the numbers of a fraudulently obtained card, be
less culpable than if the same defendant purchased the same
ticket in person by signing a receipt?
The State's position is even more untenable when viewing
the legislative history of the laws1 recodification.

Under

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
the State view,
the Machine-generated
"more specific"
provisions of §76-6-506.1
OCR, may contain errors.

increase the penalty from a third degree felony or misdemeanor
to a second degree felony when the defendant "signs11 a receipt.
Yet nothing in the legislative history supports such a
conclusion.

Even the State's brief fails to discuss any

legislative history which supports its position.
Thus, even though §76-6-506.1 includes the words "falsely
signing evidence" of a financial transaction involving the card,
the plain and obvious interpretation, when compared with §76-6-506.2,
is that the former section cannot be read to include the defendants.
Their use of a single financial transaction card is chargeable
more specifically under the provisions of §76-6-506.2.
The position advanced by the trial court, that the proper
charges in the present case should be brought under §76-6-506.2,
is further bolstered by a policy favoring the defendant in
ambigious cases. Where neither the wording of the statute nor
its legislative history points clearly to either meaning, courts
apply the less harsh meaning.

Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S.

169, 178-179 (1958) : State v. Shondel, supra.
In Ladner v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme
Court noted:
When choice has to be made between two readings
of what Congress has made a crime, it is
appropriate, before we choose the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should
have spoken in language that is clear and definite.
We should not deprive criminal outlawry from
some ambigious implication. [Citations omitted].
Id. at 205.
While the title of §76-6-506.1 includes "Falsely Signing" in the
illegal card transaction, such words have no definitional meaning
in interpreting the act. People v Burns, 593 P.2d 351 (Colo.
1979). Courts still consider the plain and obvious meaning of
the statute.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This policy of lenity means that courts should not interpret a
criminal statute

so as to increase the penalty that it places

on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no
more than a guess as to what the legislature intended.

Utah

Code Ann. §77-17-1 (Supp. 1980), a provision not mentioned in
the Appellant's brief, provides that if there is even "reasonable
doubt11 as to which of two or more degrees a person is guilty,
they shall be convicted of "only" the lower degree (See Addendum
E

>-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the appeal in this case
should be dismissed or, in the alternative, the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this

(j^ n day of January, 1936.
Respectfully submitted,

~7(j£~

e,\ x

NANCY BERGES0N
Attorney for Defendant

\XNKJ

<SW^

KHRIS HARROLD
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

, hereby certify that
four copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

I„

_day

of January, 1986.

NANCY BERGESON
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

>V^

v^^TuryX^L

KHR
RIS HARR0LD
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

DELIVERED by

this

day of January, 1986
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NANCY BERGESON (#303)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO REDUCE OFFENSE
CHARGED FROM A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY TO A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
-vSTEVE GOMEZ

Case No. CR 85-3

Defendant

(Judge Billings)

The defendant, STEVE GOMEZ, by and through his attorney
of record, NANCY BERGESON, hereby moves this Court for an .
Order reducing the crime charged from Wrongful Use of a
Financial Transaction Card, a Second Degree Felony, to Attempted
Wrongful Use of a Financial Transaction Card, a Third Degree
Felony.
Defendant further moves that the Defendant's trial
i

presently set for February 4, 1985, before this Court proceed
on the charge of Attempted Wrongful Use of a Financial Transaction Card, a Third Degree Felony.
DATED this

<.;-J-5

day of January, 1985.
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the
Salt Lake
ke County Attorney, 231 East Fourth Soul
South, Salt Lake
-V*
City, Utah, this «?*W "
day of January, 1985
;

V?uv
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NANCY BERGESON (#303)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION
TO REDUCE OFFENSE CHARGED
FROM A SECOND DEGREE TO A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY

-vSTEVE GOMEZ

Case No. CR 85-3
Defendant

(Judge Billings)

TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the above
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 31st
day of January, 1985, at the hour of

9:00

a.m. before the

Honorable JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Third District Court Judge.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

day of January, 1985.

't^r

NANCY B^RGE^ON*/
7^
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the
Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
Cityf Utah, this

,y</^

day of January, 1985.
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NANCY BERGESON (#303)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn<
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

JAN 51 i535

ss^y

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
REDUCE OFFENSE CHARGED

-vCase No. 85-3

STEVE GOMEZ
Defendant

(Judge Billings)

In 1969, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the case of
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, (Utah 1969) that where the
illegal conduct of a criminal defendant could be prohibited
under two separate statutes with one crime proscribing a more
severe punishment, the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of the lesser punishment.
The Defendant has been charged with the offenses of
Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card, two Second Degree Felonies
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 506,1f Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended).

The illegal conduct prohibited

uvider this section is:

r

"§76-6-506.1 Financial transaction card
offenses — Falsely making, coding, or
signing evidence of card transaction.
Any person who, with intent to defraud,
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses,
or encodes magnetically or electronically
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a
financial transaction card, or who
w
i intent to defraud, signs the name
o another or a ficticious name to a
f Miicial transaction card, sales slip,
s ies craft, or any instrument for the
p-vment of money vhich evidences a
financial transaction card transaction,
i guilty of a felony of the second
d' jree . ,f (emphasis added)
However, according to §76-6-506.5 the same conduct
may be a Class A Misdemeanor if the value of goods obtained
is less than $250, or a Third Degree Felony if the value of
the goods obtained is greater than $250 but less than $1,000.
Section 76-6-506.2, Unlawful Use of a Card, states that:
"It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud. . .
purchase or attempt to purchase goods,
'.'••' property, or services by use of a false,
ficticious, altered, counterfeit, revoked,
expired, stolen, or fraudulently obtained
financial card.
Under these two statutory schemes, the same act —

that

of fraudulently obtaining goods by a use of a financial transaction card belonging to another —

is prohibited.

One carries

a misdemeanor or third degree felony penalty; the other a second
degree felony penalty.
This Court, as the Supreme Court did in Shondel, supra,
must reconcile the inconsistency.

In Shondel, supra, the Supreme

Court reconciled a criminal statute making possession of LSD a
misdemeanor with an overlapping provision of Utah's Narcotic
Drug Act which made the same offense a felony.
the Court stated:
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In its ruling

I
"A statute creating a crime should be
sufficiently certain that persons of
ordinary intelligence. . . may know
how to conduct themselves in conformity
with it." p. 148
Further, in its ruling that the appellant therein was

(

guilty of a misdemeanor rather than a felony, it said that:

i
"A penal statute should be clear, specific
and understandable as to the penalty imposed
for its violation." p. 148
Finally, the ruling in Shondel, supra, is that:

i
"If there is doubt or uncertainty as to
which of two punishments is applicable
to an offense, an accused is entitled to
the benefit of the lesser." p. 148
In the matter before this Court, Defendant is alleged

^

to have purchased items from Honey Bear Toys and Nordstrom1s,
valued at $111.00 and $294.51, respectively, by the use of an
American Express card belonging to another person without that
person's consent.

^

He is alleged to be a party to the signing

of that person's name.

A Defendant cannot be expected to know

that he could be convicted of a second degree felony rather than

{

a third degree felony or a misdemeanor if he signs a transaction
s l i p — because one of two conflicting statutes happens to
mention "signing" while the other does not.

"

Under the law of the State of Utah, as set forth in
State v. Shondel, supra, this Court should reduce the charges
pending against the Defendant from second degree felonies to

-3-
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(

>

the applicable misdemeanor and rielony (third degree) and
conduct Defendant's trial on those charges.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ______
January, 1985.

day of

it

«•
i

NANCY BERGESON
Attorney lor Defendant
• k

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East Fpurth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this

day of January, 1985.
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77-35-26. Rule 26 — Appeals, (a) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk
of the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the order
or judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party
or his attorney of record. Proof of service of such copy shall be filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant:
(1) From the final judgment of conviction;
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the
defendant;
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the supreme
court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution:
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal;
(2) From an order arresting judgment;
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof invalid;
or
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence
when, upon a petition for review, the supreme court decides that such an appeal
would be in the interest of justice.
(d) (1) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or arrest of
judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the motion is given
to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving such notice shall be filed with the
court.
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect in the taking
therof, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The
dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another appeal can be, and
is, timely taken.
(e) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be given
a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(f) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed the
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon due notice of the hearing, shall
fail to appear for oral argument.
(g) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall govern criminal appeals
to the supreme court except as otherwise provided.
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, the case
shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless the time is extended by
the supreme court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death shall have
prjority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the
supreme court.
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit courts promulgated by the judicial council and approved by the supreme court relating to appeals from circuit
courts shall govern criminal as well as civil appeals.
(j) An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district court or juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
(k) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered in
the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except as follows:
(1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and the decision of the
district court shall be final except in cases where the validity or constitutionality
of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court;
(2) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court shall
transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the original pleadings,
all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case and the notice and undertaking on appeal;
(3) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal shall be in accordance with Rule
27; and
(1) All further proceedings shall be in the district court, including any process
required to enforce judgment.
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MLMEDT
NAN£«, BEE6ES0IF/ (#303 F and
"s;>> 1-'^ 'czi-r^Jizir"
KHRI? HSRRCSSD (#1394>
Attorneys for Defendants
f^^ Li <-.-i
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
"'""v
""J
333 South Second East
*y~~>\
^~~^
O '•'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
, C_0«=^afe-O-. K ^ d ^ "
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:'
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff
V.

:

STEVE GOMEZ and
JACQUELINE GOMEZ,
Defendants

:
:

Case No. CR-85-3
(Judge Judith M. Billings)

:

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on a Motion to Reduce the Offenses Charged in the Third Judicial
District Court.

The State was represented by Greg Bown, Deputy

Salt Lake County Attorney, the defendant Steve Gomez was present
and represented by Nancy Bergeson of the Legal Defender Association , and the Honorable Judith M. Billings was the Judge
presiding.
s

Based upon the evidence and argument at the hearing on

the Motion to Reduce the Offenses Charged, the Honorable Judith
M. Billings makes the" following findings of fact and conclusions
of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendants are charged with two counts of Wrongful

Use of a Financial Transaction Card, violations of Utah Code Ann*
§76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983), second degree felonies, in that they
fraudulently signed sales slips evidencing credit card transactions.
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2.

Section 76-6-506.1 proscribes the following unlawful

conduct:
Any person who, with intent to defraud, counterfeits,
falsely makes, embosses, or encodes magnetically or
electronically any financial transaction card, or who
with intent to defraud, signs the name of another or
a fictitious name to a financial transaction card,
sales slip, sales draft, or any instrument for the
payment of money which evidences a financial transaction card transaction, is guilty of a felony of the
second degree.
A violation of this section is a second degree felony, punishable
by the indeterminate term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison.
3.

Defendants claim a right to be charged under Utah

Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (1)(Supp 1983), which provides:
It is unlawful for any person to:
v

(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt
to obtain credit or purchase or attempt to purchase
goods, property, or services, by the use of a false,
fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired,
stolen, or fraudulently obtained financial transaction
card, by any financial transaction card credit number,
personal identification code, or by the use of a finan& cial transaction card not authorized by the issuer or
the card holder.

A violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor, punishable
by one year and/or $1,000 fine, unless the goods or services
obtained exceed $250, in which case the offense is a felony of
the third degree, punishable by the indeterminate term of 0-5
years in the Utah State Prison.

See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.5

(Supp 1983).
4.

Defendants claim that §76-6-506.1 and §76-6-506.2

proscribe identical conduct on the facts of their case, therefore
they are entitled to be charged with the offense carrying the
lesser penalty.

-2-
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5.

The state contends that these statutes do not

proscribe identical conduct, rather that §76-6-506.1 prohibits
written misrepresentations

involving

a

stolen

credit

card,

while §76-6-506.2 prohibits oral misrepresentations and other
attempts to use a
may be

charged

stolen

with

the

credit card.
former

and

Thus, the

more

specific

defendant
statute.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 and Utah Code Ann.

§76-506.2(1) must

be

where the

alleged

conduct

read

to
is

prohibit
the

identical

fraudulent

conduct,

signing

of a

sales slip evidencing a credit card transaction.
2.

Such a reading is mandated by a criminal

defendant's due process right to be fairly notified of illegal
conduct and
3.

the

punishment

which

may

be

imposed

for

it.

Such a reading is also mandated by a criminal

defendant's right to equal protection of the laws, and his or
her assurance that the law will be administered

consistently

and fairly by the County Attorney's Office.
4.

Based on the state's position that an adverse

ruling by the court should be remedied by a dismissal
than a reduction

rather

of the charges, and no objection voiced by

the defendant, the court should order both counts dismissed.
DATED this

Lfc*1^ day of March, 1985.
BY THE COURT:
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76-6-606. Fraudulent use of a credit card—"Credit card" defined.—(1)
A person is guilty of fraudulent use of a credit card if he uses a credit card
for the purpose of obtaining property, cash advance or services with intent
to defraud and with knowledge that:
(a) The card is stolen or forged;
(b) The card has expired, has been revoked, or has been cancelled; or
(c) For any other reason his use of the card or other device is unauthorized either by the issuer of the card or by the person to whom it is
issued.
(2) As used in this section and in sections 76-6-506.1, 76-6-506.2 and
76-6-506.3, "credit card" means a writing or other evidence of an undertaking to pay for property or services delivered or rendered to or upon
the order of a designated person or bearer.

76-6-506.1. Fraudulent use of a credit card—Classification of offenses.—
(1) If the aggregate value of property or services obtained by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in violation of section
76-6-506 amounts to a sum of not more than $100, such violation shall
constitute a class B misdemeanor.
(2) If the aggregate value of property or services or both obtained
by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in violation of section 76-6-506 amounts to a sum exceeding $100 but not more than
$250, such violation shall constitute a class A misdemeanor.
(3) If the aggregate value of property or services or both obtained
by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in violation of section 76-6-506 amounts to a sum exceeding $250 but not more than
$l,00(j),isuch violation shall constitute a felony of the third degree.
(4) If the aggregate value of property or services or both obtained
by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in violation of section 76-6-506 amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000 such violation
shall constitute a second degree felony.
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77-17-1. Doubt as to degree — Convicted only on lowest. When it
appears the defendant has committed a public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be
convicted only of the lower degree.
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